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More than 60 years after the detonation 
of the first nuclear device over the sands 
of New Mexico, there are still only nine 
states that have nuclear weapons. That 
leaves around 180 states that do not, in-
cluding a substantial number that could 
have developed a nuclear arsenal but have 
not done so. Why is this? With all the 
focus on North Korea and Iran (and to 
a lesser extent Syria), Dr Rublee sets out 
in Nonproliferation Norms to analyse the 
behaviour of states that actually choose 
restraint and attempts to explain their 
policy choices. It is a fascinating project 
and the result is an extremely readable 
and illuminating account of the factors 
that contributed to a decision against 
developing a nuclear arsenal in a selected 
group of states, who had all earlier seri-
ously considered such a programme (or 
had actually begun it). To some degree 
it may be thought that the details of the 
policy determinants in each case are spe-
cific to the state concerned and, thus, not 
applicable in a general way. On the other 
hand, the case studies provide a kind of 
‘item bank’ of considerations that proved 
decisive in the particular cases and may 
thus be of value in resisting proliferation 
in other cases.
Notwithstanding the experience of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan has sev-
eral times in its post-war history consid-
ered the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, 
beginning with its response to the Chi-
nese nuclear test of 1964. More recently, 
the question has returned with the period-
ic nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula. 
But, despite the fact that Japan has all it 
would need to make nuclear weapons, it 
has not done so. Rublee’s explanation for 
this is multi-faceted. Many Japanese are 
seriously committed to the quasi-pacifist 
national constitution and, of course, the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki experience con-
tinues to be a strong driver of anti-nuclear 
sentiment. Pushing in the same direction 
is a strong international norm, to which 
Japan, as a major player in international 
affairs, is very sensitive.  At the level of 
unsentimental security assessment, the 
continuing extension of the United States 
nuclear umbrella is also a significant fac-
tor, although if this were to change it is 
arguable that realist considerations might 
trump the national anti-nuclear ‘norm’, 
notwithstanding Japan’s unique experi-
ence.
The case of Egypt is very different. It 
does not have the same indigenous anti-
nuclear drivers and there are reasons for 
believing that the Egyptian public would 
have supported nuclear weapons develop-
ment. Indeed, recent surveys have shown 
that Egyptians support the nuclear pro-
gramme of Iran. It is also the case that 
Egypt is confronted by a nuclear capable 
adversary (Israel), against whom it has 
already lost four wars. So why, then, has 
Egypt not (to this point) seriously con-
sidered developing a nuclear arsenal? Ru-
blee’s answer seems to turn on a subtle cal-
culation by the Egyptian leadership that 
Egypt’s interests would be better served by 
a strong attachment to international insti-
tutions and the non-proliferation norm. 
In this way it could put moral pressure on 
Israel and secure financial support (partic-
ularly from the United States) to develop 
the national economy. This consideration 
intersects with another case that Rublee 
considers: that of Libya. Here, there was 
an on-going nuclear weapons programme 
on which vast amounts of money had al-
ready been spent, but the long-time Libyan 
leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, nonethe-
less changed his view. Perhaps influenced 
by his son, he abruptly renounced his 
‘bad-boy’ behaviours (support for terror-
ism, the nuclear weapons programme) in 
search of international co-operation in the 
development of the Libyan economy.
The other cases that Rublee discusses 
are Sweden and Germany, both of which 
seriously considered the need for nuclear 
weapons in the light of the threat posed by 
Soviet Russia in the early years of the Cold 
War. Both states also went on to develop 
substantial and sophisticated civilian nu-
clear capability but, at the same time as 
they did this, they developed a strong 
anti-nuclear weapon position, which en-
joyed considerable public support. It is 
also worth noting that Germany (and 
before that, West Germany) was a mem-
ber of the North Atlantic Alliance and, as 
such, came under the NATO nuclear um-
brella; indeed, it had substantial nuclear 
weaponry stationed on its territory.
These few details from Rublee’s com-
prehensive account underline the point 
made earlier about the plethora of vari-
ables: the character of the political regime; 
the security environment; regional history; 
state of technological development (and 
particularly nuclear technology) and the 
actual personalities of the leaders (Qadd-
afi makes the decision to begin a nuclear 
weapon programme and to end it). And 
when we extend our focus to states of 
present proliferation concern (North Ko-
rea, Iran, Syria) we see yet further varia-
tions. What factors might drive decisions 
for, or against, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons (or persistence with an existing 
programme) in the case of highly-person-
alised leadership in an unreformed com-
munist dictatorship with nothing to lose, 
or in an Islamic theocracy with uncertain 
lines of authority?
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But for Dr Rublee the major influence 
on policy formation is not any of these 
essentially realist concerns but rather it is 
consequence of a persistent international 
advocacy of a clear non-proliferation 
norm. Indeed, the first two chapters of the 
book (50 pages) are concerned with a de-
tailed description of how such norms are 
constructed and transmitted. In part, her 
account is essentially descriptive. There 
is an international norm against nuclear-
weapon proliferation and it is enshrined 
in international institutions, including the 
protocols of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency. It is also reflected in the poli-
cies adopted by indigenous activist groups 
and political elites and, as her case studies 
show, it is a factor in national decision-
making. Rublee gives considerable detail 
about how the process of norm transmis-
sion works, how the tactics of ‘diplomatic 
influence’ (‘back-patting’ or ‘shaming’) 
give rise to conformity and identification, 
which, in turn, produce ‘internalisation’ 
and ‘persuasion’. Of course, there is an-
other word to describe all this and that is 
‘manipulation’ and there is another way to 
view Rublee’s constructivist analysis and 
that is to see it as essentially prescriptive. 
On this reading, the sub-title of Non-
proliferation Norms is ‘Why states should 
choose nuclear restraint’.
    Late on in the book, Rublee observes: 
‘As in the four preceding case studies, the 
Germans learned and came to internal-
ise that security is best achieved without, 
rather than with, nuclear weapons.’ To 
this reviewer it is a conclusion that is not 
warranted by the data. Germany’s deci-
sion is consistent with an assessment that, 
embedded in NATO, it does not need nu-
clear weapons and it can benefit from the 
good opinion of other states and avoid lo-
cal criticism from anti-nuclear groups by 
repudiating any intentions in this regard, 
without prejudicing its security interests. The 
fact that there are a significant number of 
states that could have gone nuclear but did 
not may well show that there is a powerful 
international norm towards non-prolif-
eration, but it does not show that global 
security would be enhanced by nuclear 
disarmament, or even that states that have 
renounced nuclear weapons believe that 
to be the case.
Nonproliferation Norms is a well-writ-
ten account of national policy formation 
in the matter of nuclear-weapon acquisi-
tion and it contains valuable insights into 
what has proved decisive in decisions for 
nuclear restraint. It may well be very use-
ful in continuing efforts to ‘hold the line’ 
in the matter of proliferation in the years 
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Hugh Templeton has done a great service 
to all those interested in New Zealand’s 
place in world affairs by producing this 
edition of Sir Carl Berendsen’s previously 
unpublished memoirs. The memoirs were 
written, it appears from internal evidence, 
in the mid-1950s shortly after his retire-
ment. Templeton has skilfully condensed 
Berendsen’s expansive reminiscences that 
are divided into a lengthy narrative and a 
collection of essays on major personalities 
he had known into a concise and highly 
readable text. The main parts of the book 
are an insightful and amusing recollection 
of Berendsen by Tom Larkin, the mem-
oirs, a list of characters and two useful ap-
pendices. The appendices consist of a col-
lection of notable speeches and statements 
by Berendsen and a reprint of Professor 
Ann Trotter’s important article ‘Personal-
ity and Foreign Policy: Sir Carl Berendsen 
in Washington’. The inclusion of some 
of Berendsen’s typically well-crafted and 
forthright speeches nicely complements 
the memoirs. The book includes many 
useful editorial notes that elucidate a wide 
range of points mentioned in the text.
The first section of the memoirs deals 
with Berendsen’s early life and career in 
the public service and contains much in-
teresting information about the way in 
which the New Zealand public service 
operated in the first quarter of the 20th 
century. Included in this section are some 
typically barbed assessments of senior 
public servants and politicians. Ward’s 
1928–30 Cabinet is, for instance, de-
scribed as containing ‘a few sensible and 
experienced Ministers, but for the most 
part they were the queerest set of dullards 
and incompetents I have ever come across 
in comparable positions’. 
The second part of the memoirs deals 
with the period between 1926 and 1943, 
during much of which Berendsen was a 
virtual one-man foreign ministry. One of 
the highlights of this book is the often un-
expected insights it gives into a wide range 
of people Berendsen encountered in the 
course of his career. We learn, for instance, 
that William Jordan, New Zealand’s high 
commissioner in London during the first 
Labour government, could be very good 
company, but that he was ‘a mixture of 
the good, the silly and the unpleasant’. Be-
rendsen’s account of a visit to Geneva with 
Jordan to attend a meeting of the League 
of Nations is typically revealing. He first 
outlines Jordan’s reluctance to follow in-
structions from his government, and then 
concludes by noting that, unlike Savage 
and Fraser, Jordan
 went out of his way to scout the pos-
sibility of war. ‘There’ll be no war,’ 
Jordan screamed in his high falsetto, 
and with the utmost contempt for 
those who prudently held the oppo-
site view. ‘All this talk of war is just 
moonshine.’ 
The final section of the memoirs deals 
with Berendsen’s diplomatic career. Be-
tween 1943 and 1952 he served first as 
New Zealand’s high commissioner in 
Canberra and then as New Zealand’s 
minister (later ambassador) in Washing-
ton. His views on politicians and public 
life in Australia and United States are, as 
might be expected, candid. Berendsen, for 
example, comments that
 I could never have imagined the lan-
guage used at times in the Common-
wealth Parliament. Bad tempered 
and ill intentioned, the two parties 
warred without restraint. No holds 
were barred, no words were too crude. 
Australian Parliaments were not, as in 
Wellington, dull.
Berendsen’s memoirs have been for many 
years an important source for historians. 
They are not, however, wholly reliable. 
Berendsen, for instance, skates over his 
military service and presents a simplistic 
ahead, but it should not be seen as a vehi-
cle for the naïve anti-nuclearism of Global 
Zero and the ‘Prague speech’.
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